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Abstract 
A micropayment scheme is proposed to enable 
transactions of different denominations and to eliminate 
possibilities that either the vendor or the user in a 
payment system misbehaves to get illegal profit.  The 




The Internet is, nowadays, a source for information 
seekers to have a variety of services such as stock quotes, 
news reports, video streams, etc.  These multimedia 
services in essence may include text, audio, and/or video 
information that have different values for information 
providers.  As the cost of each kind of service differs 
from one anther, every service may need different 
numbers of tokens if single-denomination tokens, such as 
payword, the payment token of PayWord [1] protocol, is 
chosen as the information seeker’s payment tool.  
PayWord uses a one-way hash function to produce 
successive tokens, and it is frequently referred to among 
other schemes in literature, such as Millicent [2], iKP [3], 
and MicroMint [1].  With the irreversible characteristic 
of one-way hash function, this scheme prohibits receivers 
of a payword token from guessing subsequent tokens 
while keeping the process of transactions efficient.  If a 
service costs more than a single token, the nature of 
payword token leaves the potential risk to the token 
holder that he or she may lose some or all tokens given to 
the service provider without receiving anything.  When 
the span of Internet services consistently grows, the 
flexibility of payment tools should be noticed. 
In addition to flexibility, the issue of fairness is 
generally important for most on-line payments.  In the 
environment of micropayment transactions, this issue is 
usually left intact.  When a payword token is passed to 
the vendor, it is the user’s potential loss that the vendor 
might redeem that token without sending the target 
information good to the user.  Namely, the vendor may 
gain improper advantage over the user in PayWord 
protocol if he or she accumulates and redeems tokens 
without offering services.   
We hereby propose a solution to prevent misconducts 
of both the user and the vendor while retaining its 
payment flexibility in transaction value.  It is particularly 
suitable for web sites providing multimedia services that 
have payments of different values. 
2. Literature Review 
In this paper, discussion and analysis are focused on 
PayWord and other protocols based on the successive 
release of elements in a chain of cryptographic hash 
values.  There are three participants in PayWord: the user 
U, the vendor V and the broker B.  Each user has to 
register with information such as the broker’s name, the 
user’s name and the user’s public key, with at least one 
broker, which offers a PayWord certificate.  This 
relationship is represented by a PayWord certificate 
signed and issued by the broker, which binds the broker’s 
name, the user’s name and the user’s public key together. 
Before U requests a service from V, a fresh chain of 
hash values wn, wn-1, …, w1, w0 is generated by randomly 
picking wn in formula (1). 
wi-1 = h(wi), for i = n, n-1, …, 1. (1) 
Notably, h is a one-way hash function, which is 
publicly known and cryptographically strong.  
Furthermore, w0 represents a root of the hash chain, and 
is delivered to V at the beginning of a service session.  
Root w0 authorizes B to pay V for any of the tokens in 
this chain that V redeems thereafter. 
U’s ith micropayment to V consists of the pair (wi, i).  
The validity of this token can be verified by V using wi-1 
which is known from the previous payment or from the 
commitment in case of i = 1. 
If no dispute occurs, V presents w0 and the final token 
received to B.  B verifies their legitimacy and if 
successful, pays V the amount that corresponds to the 
tokens and charges the same amount to U’s account.  
When V misbehaves, U will lose at least the last token 
already sent to V.  Even though the value of a payword 
token is not high enough to cause serious loss for the user, 
a persistently cheating vendor can collect a substantial 
amount of money by sending an unexpected service or 
nothing at all. 
 
3. Revised scheme 
The proposed micropayment scheme is a variation of 
PayWord, and it is also inspired by Asokan et al.’s 
proposal, an approach that achieves a complete and fair 
exchange [6].  The main idea of our scheme is to make a 
valid token a combination of two hash values from two 
independent hash chains.  These two hash values can be 
regarded as two half-tokens.  The first is forwarded to the 
vendor before service provision and the second is not 
sent until the service is provided.  That is, unless the 
vendor offers the requested service, a complete token 
cannot be collected and redeemed.  This feature secures 
the user from the vendor’s malicious redemption without 
offering the requested service. 
Before transactions begin, U must register with B and 
obtain a signed certificate.  Information recorded on this 
certificate includes U’s id, B’s id, and U’s public key.  
Thus, U generates fresh hash values; pn, and qn are 
randomly chosen, and n is decided based on his or her 
own need.  Via the same secure one-way hash function 
h( ), U computes two hash chains pn, pn-1, … , p0 and qn, 
qn-1, … , q0 as shown in formulae (2) and (3). 
pi-1 = h(pi), i = n, n-1, …, 1 . (2) 
qi-1 = h(qi), i = n, n-1, …, 1 . (3) 
The roots of the chains are p0 and q0, and U sends 
these values to V at the beginning of the service session.  
Thus, every legitimate token is composed of two hash 
values; i.e., the token used in the ith transaction is (pi, qi, 
i). 
U V
M3 = (p1 ,1)
M4 = service
M5 = (q1,1)
M1 = SU(V, B, p0, q0, service_description)
M2 = SV(h(M1))
Fig. 1. The initialization steps and the first 
transaction of the proposed protocol 
U begins a new transaction session by passing p0, q0, n, 
user certificate, as well as a general description of the 
requested service to V as a session commitment.  A 
transaction session may have one or more transactions 
that U pays by the same token chain.  V uses this 
commitment for token verification when tokens from U 
have been received.  Then V signs and returns this 
message as his service provision commitment to offer the 
requested service.  The initialization procedure of a 
transaction session is completed when the service 
provision commitment (M2 in Figure 1) is transmitted to 
U.  This procedure is shown as the first two messages 
transmitted in Figure 1. 
 
When a transaction session begins, U sends (pi, i) to V 
as the first half-token of the ith micropayment.  As a half-
token, pi also represents U’s payment commitment for 
that transaction.  V validates pi by comparing p0 and the 
result of hashing pi i times.  The root p0 is retrieved from 
U’s session commitment.  If the validity of pi is 
confirmed, V may transmit the requested service to U.  U 
must provide the second half-token (qi, i) after receiving 
the service.  The vendor examines this half-token in the 
same manner exactly as the first half was. 
In an ideal case, V sends B the session commitment of 
U and the last token collected, requesting payment 
redemption.  B pays V and charges U the value of i 
tokens. 
Because the proposed enables payments that cost 
multiple tokens, the issue of dispute handling should be 
more carefully examined.  If disputes occur between U 
and V, they can be either one of the following two cases.  
If V refuses to offer the service U requested after 
receiving the first half-token (pi, i), U has no loss as long 
as U does not send (qi, i).  Even V receives other first 
half-tokens such as (pi+1, i+1) for successive transactions, 
he or she can only verify the validity of first half-tokens.  
Without receiving requested services, U will not send the 
second half-tokens.  In this case, V cannot get any illegal 











Fig. 2. Dispute handling 
The other case is shown in Figure 2, which occurs 
when U refuses to pay the second half-token after 
receiving the requested service.  V in this case may show 
B the information collected from U’s session and 
payment commitments previously received.  The target 
service of this transaction also has to be sent to B.  Being 
a trusted third party, B justifies the dispute based on the 
information offered by V.  If it is U’s malicious behavior 
to refuse to pay, B will pay V from U’s registered account 
directly, and pass the target service to U.  Hence neither 
U nor V benefits from misbehaving in this case. 
If true fairness is not absolutely necessary or the 
dispute handing efficiency is a serious concern, the idea 
proposed by Buttyán can also be applied in this proposed 
scheme.  U is charged once the first half-token is sent; 
regardless of whether the second half-token is paid for or 
not.  When V attempts to redeem with only a half-token, 
he or she will not be given the value of the incomplete 




The proposed scheme makes the user free from 
possible losses caused by payments that cost more than 
one token.  And it is applicable to most practical Internet 
micropayment environment.  When a user U intends to 
receive some information services from an on-line news 
web site V, for example, objects including text files, 
voice streams or even video clips satisfying the keyword 
are available.  If these types of information objects are 
charged at different rates, the user of PayWord or other 
related extensions has to prepare token chains 
representing different denominations, otherwise he or she 
will have possible loss if paying multiple tokens of the 
same hash chain to a misbehaved web site.  The user 
therefore has to prepare tokens of all denominations he or 
she needs before the transaction session begins.  In case 
the user requests for a video clip that costs six tokens, 
either this user generates a new hash chain and tells the 
vendor that each token of this new chain represents 
exactly six units, or he has possible loss when giving all 
six tokens from the same hash chain.  In other words, if 
malicious V is given w6 in PayWord, all six tokens from 
w1 to w6 can be verified and redeemed directly.  Similarly, 
if V is given w6 in Buttyán’s scheme, three tokens (w1, w2, 
1), (w3, w4, 2) and (w5, w6, 3) will be regarded as valid 
and redeemed.  Another way to avoid such loss is to 
make every payment a combination of tokens from 
chains that represent different denominations.  Both 
situations would not be convenient enough for the web 
surfers and would cause restriction to micropayment 
applications. 
In addition, the PayWord user might lose all i tokens 
if he or she pays wi for some service that costs i tokens.  
Similar situations occur in other PayWord-like 
micropayment schemes.  In this proposed scheme, the 
two half-tokens, (pi, i) and (qi, i), are chosen from two 
independent hash chains.  Hence even a service costs i 
tokens, V can only verify the received pi.  There is no 
means to compute a complete token unless U reveals the 
second half-token qi.  Taking the situation stated in the 
previous paragraph as an example, when U has paid pi 
and the requested news report has yet to be received, U is 
free from any loss as long as he or she does not send qi to 
V.  It is easy for the on-line news web site to verify pi via 
p0, but mathematically difficult to compute or guess qi.  
Hence, the web site V collects a full token (pi, qi) only if 
U receives the report and sends qi. 
In terms of efficiency, our scheme is roughly the same 
as Buttyán’s.  PayWord, Buttyán and the proposed all 
have the same number of public key cryptographic 
operations, including digital signature generation and 
verification.  Although the proposed scheme requires 
twice the number of hash computation as PayWord does, 
it is still affordable due to the computation efficiency of 
hash function.  Regarding transmission payload, this 
protocol sends 2 hash values for every consecutive 
transaction step, which is 1 hash value more than 
Buttyán’s scheme.  It would not cause serious network 
loading considering the size of a single hash value. 
In comparison to Buttyán’s and other PayWord-like 
schemes, the proposed offers better protection for both 
the user and the vendor.  PayWord cannot justify the 
malicious denial of service when V redeems the received 
paywords.  U can only minimize his or her loss by 
refusing to make further transactions with V passively, 
after losing some tokens for incomplete services.  In 
other words, by accumulating tokens from numerous 
users, the malicious vendor still gets a fortune of illegal 
profit.  As to Buttyán’s protocol, although neither U nor 
V takes improper advantage over the other party, V still 
bears potential losses when U refuses to pay after 
receiving the requested service.  U in this scenario will be 
charged, but the revenue will be donated to charity 
instead of distributing to V.  Our scheme does not cause 
such losses.  As long as the second half-tokens are kept 
by U, V cannot make any illegal profit by redeeming the 
incomplete first half-tokens.  If U refuses to pay the 
second half-token after receiving the target service, B 
will be the trusted third party to justify whether V should 
be paid.  Hence the proposed protocol causes no losses in 
the scenarios mentioned above. 
 
5. Conclusion 
A variation of the PayWord protocol was proposed to 
enable payments of different values without much loss in 
efficiency while the rights of both the user and the 
vendor are well protected.  It solves the problem to pay 
varieties of multimedia services of different costs.  
Comparing to PayWord, it although requires twice as 
many on-line hash computations by the vendor, the 
complexity of hash computation should not be a real 
burden.  Thus the advantages of this scheme lead 
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